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Abstract
We propose gradient adversarial training, an auxiliary deep learning framework
applicable to different machine learning problems. In gradient adversarial training,
we leverage a prior belief that in many contexts, simultaneous gradient updates
should be statistically indistinguishable from each other. We enforce this consis-
tency using an auxiliary network that classifies the origin of the gradient tensor, and
the main network serves as an adversary to the auxiliary network in addition to per-
forming standard task-based training. We demonstrate gradient adversarial training
for three different scenarios: (1) as a defense to adversarial examples we classify
gradient tensors and tune them to be agnostic to the class of their corresponding
example, (2) for knowledge distillation, we do binary classification of gradient
tensors derived from the student or teacher network and tune the student gradient
tensor to mimic the teacher’s gradient tensor; and (3) for multi-task learning we
classify the gradient tensors derived from different task loss functions and tune
them to be statistically indistinguishable. For each of the three scenarios we show
the potential of gradient adversarial training procedure. Specifically, gradient adver-
sarial training increases the robustness of a network to adversarial attacks, is able to
better distill the knowledge from a teacher network to a student network compared
to soft targets, and boosts multi-task learning by aligning the gradient tensors
derived from the task specific loss functions. Overall, our experiments demonstrate
that gradient tensors contain latent information about whatever tasks are being
trained, and can support diverse machine learning problems when intelligently
guided through adversarialization using a auxiliary network.
1 Introduction
In backpropagation [26] the gradient of the loss function is evaluated with respect to weight tensor
in each layer, and and the weights are updated using a learning rule [17]. Gradient tensors recur-
sively evaluated through backpropagation can successfully train deep networks with millions of
weight parameters across hundreds of layers and generalize to unseen examples [11]. However, a
mathematical formalism of the generalization ability of deep neural networks (DNNs) trained using
backpropagation remains elusive. Indeed, a lack of formalism has given rise to new domains in deep
learning such as robustness of DNNs in particular to adversarial examples [30], domain adaptation
[6], multi-task learning [19], model compression [2] etc. Here, we investigate the potential of
gradient tensors derived during back propagation to serve as an additional cue to learning in these
new domains.
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Figure 1: Gradient Adversarial Training (GREAT) of Neural Networks. The legends on the top
left and right of the figure show the information flow in the networks and the different kinds of
modules. (a) The general methodology of GREAT wherein the main network is trained using standard
backpropagation and also acts as an adversary to the auxiliary network via gradient reversal. The
auxiliary network is trained on gradient tensors evaluated during backpropagation. (b) GREAT
procedure for adversarial defense: The auxiliary network performs the same classification as the main
network, albeit with gradient tensors as input. (c) GREAT method for knowledge distillation: The
auxiliary network performs binary classification on the gradient tensors from the student and teacher
networks. (d) GREAT method for multi-task learning: The auxiliary networks classifies the gradient
tensors from the different task decoders and aligns them through gradient reversal and an explicit
gradient alignment layer described later.
As demonstrated in prior research, the gradient tensor of the scalar loss function with respect to the
input or intermediate layer, termed the Jacobian J , is highly informative [27]. This follows naturally
from the equations of backpropagation for a perceptron,
δl = (wl+1)T δl+1  σ′(zl), (1)
with δL = ∇aC  σ′(zL). Here δ is the gradient tensor, l is the layer with L being the final layer,
∇aC is the gradient of loss function with respect to the neural network output a after the final
activation, σ is the activation function, zl is the output after layer l with a = σ′(zL), w is the weight
matrix, and  is the Hadamard product. It follows from these equations that the gradient tensor at
any layer is a function of both the loss function and all succeeding weight matrices. The information
from gradient tensors have been employed classically for regularization [5] and more recently for
visualizing saliency maps [28], interpreting DNNs [32, 29], generating adversarial examples [8] and
weakly supervised object localization[27]. Most approaches use the information from the gradient
tensor in a separate step to achieve the desired quantitative or qualitative result. Different from these
approaches, we use the gradient tensor during the training procedure via an adversarial process [7] in
our proposed GRadiEnt Adversarial Training (GREAT) procedure.
The main premise underlying GREAT is that the information in the gradient tensor inhibits reliable
training dynamics under certain scenarios. GREAT aims to nullify the dark information in the gradient
tensors by first processing the gradient tensor in an auxiliary network and then passing an adversarial
signal back to the main network (Figure 1a) via the gradient reversal procedure [6]. This adversarial
signal regularizes the weight tensors in the main network akin to double backpropagation [5]. Using
calculus, the adversarial gradient signal % flowing forward in the main network can be shown to be,
%l+1 = −wl+1%l  σ′(zl), (2)
which is of a similar functional form as δ but of opposite sign and affected by preceding weight
matrices till the layer of the considered gradient tensor. As networks tend to have perfect sample
expressiveness as soon as the number of parameters exceeds the number of data points [33], we expect
the regularization provided by the auxiliary network to improve robustness and not considerably affect
performance. We describe the dark information present in the gradient tensors in three scenarios: (a)
adversarial examples, (b) multi-task learning, and (c) knowledge distillation [12]. We describe the
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intuition behind using GREAT for these three scenarios in the subsequent paragraphs and describe
the exact training methodology in Section 3.
Adversarial examples are carefully crafted perturbations applied to normal images which are usually
imperceptible to humans, but can seriously confuse state-of-the-art deep learning models [30, 8]. A
common step to all adversarial example generation is calculating the gradient of the objective function
with respect to the input [20] called the saliency map. The objective function is either the task loss
function or derived from it. This gradient tensor is processed to perturb the original image, and the
model mis-classifies the perturbed image. We use GREAT to make the saliency maps uninformative
(Figure 1b), and hence, mitigate the network’s susceptibility to adversarial examples.
The objective of knowledge distillation is to compress the predictive behavior of a cumbersome DNN
(teacher) or an ensemble of DNNs into a simpler model (student) [12, 10]. Distilling knowledge to a
student network is achieved by matching the logits or soft output distribution of the teacher to the
output of the student in addition to usual supervised loss function. In Figure 1c, we show how GREAT
provides a complementary approach to distillation wherein we statistically match the gradient tensor
of the teacher to the student using the auxiliary network, in lieu of matching output distributions.
In multi-task learning, a single network is trained end-to-end to achieve multiple related but different
task outputs for an input [19]. This is achieved by having a common encoder and separate task-
specific decoder. In a perfect multi-task learning scenario, the gradient tensors of the individual
task-loss functions with respect the the last shared layer in the encoder should be indistinguishable
so as to coherently train all the shared layers in the encoder. We use GREAT to train a gradient
alignment layer between the encoder and task-specific decoders which operates in the backward pass
so that the task-specific gradient tensors are less distinguishable by the auxiliary network (Figure 1d).
In Section 2, we describe the GREAT procedure for each of the above scenarios. In Section 3, we
highlight the results of GREAT and in Section 4 we discuss conclusions and possible avenues of
future work. Note we discuss relevant work as appropriate in the remainder of this article.
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Figure 2: Adversarial defense comprised
of GREAT and GREACE. In GREACE,
the output probability distribution from
auxiliary network is added to the gradient
of the loss with respect to the logits in the
main network to help separate negative
classes whose gradient tensors are similar
to primary class.
We describe the adaptations of GREAT suitable for ad-
versarial defense, knowledge distillation and multi-task
learning.
2.1 Adversarial defense
The general objective for defense against adversarial ex-
amples is
J(θ, x, y) = J(θ, x+ ∆, y) , ∀ ‖∆‖p ≤ . (3)
Here, x is the input, y the output, θ the network param-
eters, ∆ is the perturbation tensor whose p-norm is con-
strained to be less than , and J subsumes the loss func-
tion and the network architecture. Non-targeted attacks
are devised by x + f(∇J(θ, x, y)), i.e., moving in the
direction of the gradient of the ground truth class y, where
f is usually the sign function in FGSM; whereas targeted
attacks are calculated as x− f(∇J(θ, x, y¯)) for y¯ 6= y.
Using first order Taylor series approximation in equation
3 amounts to the equivalent formulation,
∇J(θ, x+ ∆, y)∆ ≈ 0 , ∀ ‖∆‖p ≤ . (4)
Previous attempts at adversarial defenses have focused on minimizing ‖∇J(θ, x+ ∆, y)‖p locally
at the training points [22, 25, 13, 9]. However, this leads to a sharp curvature of the loss surface
near those points, violating the first order Taylor approximation, which in turn makes the defense
ineffective [24].
GREAT: Our GREAT procedure removes the class-specific information present in the gradient tensor.
Formally, for all N samples in the training set,
∇J(θ, xi, yi) = ∇J(θ, xi, yˆi) , ∀yˆi 6= yi and ∀i ∈ N. (5)
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for defense against adversarial examples using GREAT and GREACE
1: procedure TRAIN(θ, θ´) . Requires inputs x, labels y, penalty β
2: while j < jmax do . j is current iteration
3: C ← J(θ, x, y) . Main network loss by forward pass
4: g ← ∇J¯(θ, x, y) . Evaluate masked gradient tensor w.r.t. x
5: C´ ← J(θ´, g, y) . Auxiliary network loss by forward pass
6: θ´(j)→ θ´(j + 1) . Update weights in auxiliary network using C´
7: ∇C´g ← −α∇J(θ´, g, y) . Evaluate reversed gradient w.r.t g
8: ∇aCˆ ← ∇aC + β ∗ S(a´)1yˆ 6=y . Evaluate GREACE loss
9: θ(j)→ θ(j + 1) . Update weights in main network using∇aCˆ,∇gC´
In the absence of class-specific information, a single-step targeted attack becomes hard as the
perturbation tensor is class-agnostic. However, GREAT makes the gradient tensors class-agnostic or
in other words obfuscates the gradient. Networks with obfuscated gradients are still vulnerable to
sophisticated iterative attacks [1] and to universal adversarial perturbations [21]. Hence, as a second
line of defense we propose gradient-adversarial cross-entropy (GREACE) loss.
GREACE: GREACE adapts the cross-entropy loss function to add weight to the negative classes
whose gradient tensors are similar to those of the primary class. The weight is added to the negative
classes in the gradient tensor flowing backward from the soft-max activation, before back-propagating
through the rest of the main network (see Figure 2). The weight is evaluated using the soft-max
distribution from the auxiliary network which indicates the similarity of gradient tensor of the
primary class to the negative classes. This added weight helps separate the high-dimensional decision
boundary between easily confused classes, similar in spirit to confidence penalty [23] and focal
loss [18], albeit from the perspective of gradients. Mathematically, the gradient tensor from the
cross-entropy loss is modified in the following way,
∇aCˆ 7→ ∇aC + β ∗ σ(a´)1yˆ 6=y. (6)
Here, Cˆ and C are the GREACE and original cross-entropy functions respectively, a and a´ are the
output activations from the main and auxiliary network respectively, σ is the soft-max function, β
is a penalty parameter, and 1yˆ 6=y is a one-hot function for all yˆ not equal to the original class y,
i.e., negative classes. The gradient fed into the auxiliary network is masked after passing through
the soft-max function in the main network, ∇Ca1y. This avoids the auxiliary classifier to catch
onto gradient cues from negative classes and only concentrates on the class in question. We also
experimented with the unmasked gradient tensor, but the results weren’t as good. The combined
objective for adversarial defense is:
minθJˆ(θ, x, y) + α maxθ´J(θ´,∇J¯(θ, x, y), y). (7)
Jˆ indicates the GREACE, J indicates the standard cross-entropy, J¯ indicates the masked cross-
entropy, and α is a weight parameter for the auxiliary network’s loss.
2.2 Knowledge distillation
In classical distillation [12] the student’s output distribution S(x) mimics the teacher’s soft output
distribution T (x). In GREAT, the student model mimics teacher model’s gradient distribution which
is a weaker constraint as it allows final distributions to differ by a constant value. A solution for
student, S(x) which jointly minimizes the supervised loss and ∇S(x) = ∇T (x) exists, as proved
in [4]. GREAT uses a discriminator to match the gradient distributions owing to the success of
adversarial losses [7] over traditional regression-based loses. The GREAT procedure for knowledge
distillation mimics a GAN training procedure. The binary classifier discriminates between student
and teacher model gradients and drives the student model to generate gradient tensor distribution
similar to the teacher model as shown in Figure 1c. The objective to be optimized is:
(1− α) minθJ(θ, x, y) + α minθmaxωD(θ, ω, x, y) (8a)
D(θ, ω, x, y) = Et∼∇T (x)logf(t, ω) + Es∼∇J(θ,x,y)log(1− f(s, ω)). (8b)
f is the binary classifier with ω parameters, s, t are gradient tensors from the student and teacher,
respectively, E denotes expectation, and α is a loss balancing parameter. GREAT has no hyper-
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for knowledge distillation using GREAT procedure
1: procedure TRAIN(θ, θ´) . Requires inputs x, labels y, teacher T with parameters τ
2: while j < jmax do . j is current iteration
3: C ← J(θ, x, y) . Student network loss by forward pass
4: gs ← ∇J(θ, x, y) . Evaluate student gradient tensor w.r.t. x
5: gt ← ∇J(τ, x, y) . Evaluate teacher gradient tensor w.r.t. x
6: C´ ← Jˆ(θ´, gt, 1) + Jˆ(θ´, gs, 0) . Binary classifier loss by forward pass
7: θ´(j)→ θ´(j + 1) . Update weights in auxiliary network using C´
8: ∇C ← (1− α)∇J(θ, x, y) . Evaluate gradient tensor of loss
9: ∇gs C´ ← −α∇Jˆ(θ´, gs, 0) . Evaluate reversed gradient w.r.t gs
10: θ(j)→ θ(j + 1) . Update weights in main network using∇C,∇gs C´
parameter controlling the teacher’s distribution to be matched, unlike the hard to set temperature
parameter in [12]. However, we have an extra pass through the student network.
2.3 Multi-task learning
GradNorm [3] adaptively balances the loss-weights based on the norm of the gradients. The GREAT
procedure for multi-task learning can be viewed as a generalization of GradNorm with two important
differences: (1) We do not enforce that the gradients have balanced norms, but instead, desire that
they have similar statistical distributions. This is achieved by the auxiliary network similar to a
discriminator in a GAN setting. (2) Instead of assigning task-weights, we add extra-capacity to the
network in the form of gradient-alignment layers (GALs). These layers are placed after the shared
encoder and before each of the task-specific decoders as shown in Figure 3. They have the same
dimensions as the last shared feature tensor minus the batch size, and are active only during the
backward pass, i.e., the GALs are dropped during forward inference.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for multi-task learning using GREAT on GALs
1: procedure TRAIN(θ, θ´, ωi, γi) . Requires inputs x, labels for tasks yi
2: γi ← 1, C0i ← Ji(θ, ωi, x, yi) . Initialize GAL tensors with ones and initial task losses
3: while j < jmax do . j is current iteration
4: Ci ← Ji(θ, ωi, x, yi)/C0i ∀i . Normalize task losses after forward pass
5: gfi ← ∇Ji(ωi, x, yi) ∀i . Evaluate task gradient tensors w.r.t. feature f
6: ωi(j)→ ωi(j + 1) ∀i . Update weights in decoders using∇Ci
7: θ(j)→ θ(j + 1) . Update weights in encoder using∑i gfi γi
8: C´ ← J´(θ´, gfi γi, y´) . Task classification loss by forward pass
9: θ´(j)→ θ´(j + 1) . Update weights in task classifier network using C´
10: ∇γi C´ ← −∇J´(θ´, gfi γi, y´) . Evaluate reversed gradient w.r.t γi
11: γi(j)→ γi(j + 1) ∀i . Update weights in GALs using∇γi C´
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Figure 3: GREAT for multi-task learning.
The GALs are trained using reversed gradi-
ents from the auxiliary task classifier.
The auxiliary network receives the gradient tensor from
each task as input and classifies them according to task.
Successful classification implies the gradient tensors
are discriminative, which impedes training of the shared
encoder as the gradients are misaligned. The GALs mit-
igate the misalignment by element-wise scaling of the
gradient tensors from all tasks. These layers are trained
using the reversed gradient signal from the auxiliary
network, i.e., the GALs attempt to make the gradient
tensors indistinguishable. Intuitively, the GALs observe
the statistical irregularities that prompt the auxiliary
classifier to successfully discriminate between the gra-
dient tensors, and then adapt the tensors to remove the
irregularities or equalize the distributions. Note, that
the task losses are normalized by the initial loss so that
the alignment layers are tasked with local alignment
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Method
Train No-Attack Non-Targeted Targeted
FGSM iFGSM FGSM iFGSM
Worst Random Worst Random
Baseline 99.97 93.32 32.75 1.99 72.89 10.43 89.59 18.29
Adversarial 99.97 89.91 56.88 16.73 82.07 45.26 89.81 69.89
GREACE 92.56 89.84 77.90 72.40 83.39 66.23 87.13 79.10
GREAT 99.53 91.95 47.51 15.45 72.73 12.78 89.62 21.95
GRE(AT+CE) 90.87 89.97 81.28 77.04 84.53 73.52 88.57 82.38
Table 1: CIFAR-10 test accuracy in % values of different training methods on targeted and
non-targeted attacks using FGSM and iFGSM. We use  = 0.1, and set k = 10 for iFGSM.
GREA(AT+CE) is the best defense for all but one adversary highlighting the importance of gradient
adversarial training in addition to GREACE during training.
Method
Train No-Attack Non-Targeted Targeted
FGSM iFGSM FGSM iFGSM
Worst Random Worst Random
Baseline 99.97 96.20 45.97 6.26 96.20 96.20 80.27 15.65
Adversarial 99.98 94.92 58.70 8.41 94.92 94.92 83.70 19.19
GREACE 93.52 93.71 73.65 80.13 93.70 93.70 89.26 88.09
GREAT 99.76 95.58 45.95 5.95 95.58 95.58 79.09 15.68
GRE(AT+CE) 92.95 93.90 74.12 79.36 93.89 93.90 89.56 87.37
Table 2: SVHN test accuracy in % values of different training methods on targeted and non-targeted
attacks using FGSM and iFGSM. We use  = 0.2, and set k = 10 for iFGSM. GREA(AT+CE) or
GREACE is the best defense for all iFGSM and non-targeted FGSM adversaries showing that the
modified cross entropy loss robustly separates classes.
and not global loss scale alignment. Furthermore, the
soft-max activation function in the auxiliary network’s classification layer implicitly normalizes the
gradients. The values in the GAL weight tensors are initialized with ones and restricted to be positive
for training to converge. In practice, we observed that a low learning rate ensured positivity of the
GAL tensors. The overall objective for multi-task learning is:
minθ,ω1,···N
∑
i Ji(θ, ωi, γi, x, yi) + maxθ´,γi···N J´(θ´,∇Ji(ωi, x, yi)γi, y´) (9)
Ji are normalized task losses, J´ is N-class cross-entropy loss, θ, θ´ are learnable parameters in shared
encoder and auxiliary classifier, respectively, ωi, γi, yi are decoder parameters, GAL parameters, and
labels for task i respectively, and y´ represent the task labels.
3 Results
3.1 Adversarial defense
We demonstrate GREAT on the CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets. We use a ResNet-18 architecture
[11] for both datasets. We observed that ResNet models are more effective in the GREAT training
paradigm for adversarial defense relative to models without skip connections. In GREAT, skip
connections help propagate the gradient information in the usual backward pass, as well as forward
propagate the reversed gradient from the auxiliary classifier network through the main network. In
our experiments, the auxiliary network is a copy of the main network. We gradually increase the
auxiliary loss weight parameter, α and the penalty parameter, β to their final values, αmax, βmax
so as to not impede the main training task during initial epochs. We empirically set αmax = 1 and
βmax to 2 and 10 for CIFAR-10 and SVHN, respectively. These values optimally defend against
adversarial examples, while not adversely affecting the test accuracy on the original samples. The
network architectures and additional parameters are discussed in the supplement. We evaluate our
method against targeted and non-targeted adversarial examples using the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) and its iterated version (iFGSM) for k iterations. For targeted attacks we report the test
accuracy for adversaries choosing a random target class or the worst (least probability) target class.
We compare our method against adversarial training and base network with no defense mechanism in
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Figure 4: Left: Saliency maps for images in CIFAR-10 for different training methods. Baseline and
adversarial are active outside object, GREACE is sparse, GREAT is uninformative, GRE(AT+CE) is
sparse, less informative and active within object. Right: Accuracy plots of different methods against
adversaries with maximum allowed perturbation, . GREAT (yellow) is more robust than Adversarial
(blue) to non-targeted adversaries for high . GREACE (green) and GRE(AT+CE) (red) are uniformly
robust for different .
Tables 1 and 2. We employ FGSM adversaries in the adversarially trained network, described further
in the supplement. Most other defenses are not effective as reported in [1]. For CIFAR-10, we also
draw plots of the test accuracy as a function of the maximum perturbation,  allowed by the adversary
in Figure 4. Firstly, the training set accuracy indicates that GREACE acts as a strong regularizer, and
the combination of GREACE and GREAT prevents over-fitting to the training set. Second, we see
that GREAT adds robustness to non-targeted single-step attacks but fails against iterated adversary
(iFGSM), an indication of gradient obfuscation [1]. Third, we see that GREACE in isolation is
robust to adversarial attacks, however, the combination of GREAT and GREACE boosts robustness.
Surprisingly, GRE(AT+CE) performs better than adversarial training on single step attacks, even
though adversarial training is trained to be robust against them. Finally, in Figure 4 we see that
the performance of GRE(AT+CE) deteriorates slightly for strong adversaries with high  values
validating the robustness of the classifier. 2. The saliency maps for the different methods are plotted
in Figure 4 for 3 examples of CIFAR-10. Pixel activations around an object promote generation of
adversarial examples. We see that the saliency maps for baseline and adversarial training have high
pixel activations both within and around the object, whereas activations for GREAT are very noisy
and not discriminative as expected. In contrast, the saliency maps for GRE(CE+AT) are sparse and
predominantly activated within the object, hence, mitigating adversarial examples.
3.2 Knowledge distillation
We demonstrate GREAT’s potential for knowledge distillation on the CIFAR-10 and mini-ImageNet
datasets. The mini-ImageNet dataset is a subset of the original ImageNet dataset with 200 classes,
and 500 training and 50 test samples for each class. We show distillation results for 2 scenarios:
(a) all training examples are used to train the student model, i.e, dense regime and (b) only 5% of
2Single-step targeted attacks are not successful on SVHN due to the simple task of recognizing digits
Method
CIFAR-10 mini-ImageNet
CNN(S)+RN(T) RN(S)+RNx(T) RN(S)+RN152(T) RN(S)+RN152(T)
100% 5% 100% 5% 100% 5% 100% 5%
Baseline 84.74 65.41 93.19 66.73 59.24 14.41 58.02 13.79
Distillation 85.69 66.45 93.65 67.69 51.72 16.73 46.77 14.00
GREAT 85.72 66.55 93.43 67.80 59.80 16.82 56.31 14.02
Table 3: Results of knowledge distillation on CIFAR-10 and mini-ImageNet. RN refers to ResNet-18.
The third row indicates the % of all train samples used during training. GREAT performs best in the
sparse regime for all combinations and better than distillation on all but 1 scenario.
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training samples are used to train the student models, i.e., sparse regime. For CIFAR-10, we use
(i) a 5-layer CNN and a pretrained ResNet-18, and (ii) ResNet-18 and a pretrained ResNext-29-
8[31] as student-teacher combinations. For mini-ImageNet, we train a teacher ResNet-152 model
at two resolutions: (i) 64x64, (ii) 224x224 for 100 epochs and 50 epochs, respectively. We use a
ResNet-18 as the student model at both resolutions. We use a shallower version of the student model
as the auxiliary binary classifier. Details of the architecture, optimizer and learning rate policy for
each scenario are in the supplement. We compare GREAT against a baseline model trained using
cross-entropy loss, and against a distilled model trained using a combination of cross-entropy and
unsupervised KL-loss. We determined the best temperature and α parameter for distillation in the
two training regimes on the 5-layer CNN+ResNet-18 combination, and used these parameters for
the mini-ImageNet experiments. The optimal parameters were chosen through grid search for the
ResNet-18+ResNext-29-8 combination. We set α = 0.1 in all experiments using GREAT determined
from the dense training regime of CNN+ResNet-18 combination. The results are reported in Table 3.
We see that GREAT consistently performs better than the baseline and distillation in the sparse
training regime, indicating better regularization by the gradient adversarial signal. The baseline
model performs best for the full resolution, dense training regime for mini-ImageNet indicating that
the teacher model trained for only 50 epochs provides weak learning cues. Indeed, the best test
accuracy reported for mini-ImageNet at full resolution is 83.32% as opposed to our teacher model
with 71.30% top-1 accuracy. The poor performance of distillation on mini-ImageNet dense regime
indicate that the hyper parameters determined on CIFAR-10 are not transferable across datasets. In
contrast, GREAT with the same α parameter is able to coherently distill the model for both the dense
and sparse training regimes across different student-teacher combinations.
3.3 Multi-task learning
We test GREAT for multi-task learning on 2 datasets: (a) CIFAR-10 with input a noisy gray-
scale image and with tasks (i) classification, (ii) colorization, (iii) edge detection and (iv) denoised
reconstruction; (b) NYUv2 dataset wherein the tasks are (i) depth estimation, (ii) surface-normal
estimation, and (iii) key-point estimation. The input and output resolutions for the CIFAR-10 dataset
are 32x32, and the input resolution for NYUv2 is 320x320 and the output resolution is 80x80 as set
in [3]. We compare out method against the baseline of equal weights, GradNorm [3], and uncertainty
based weighting [16]. For all methods we use the same architecture: a ResNet-53 with dilated
convolution backbone and task-specific decoders. We tested GradNorm for different α values and set
it equal to 0.6 for CIFAR-10, and 1.5 for NYUv2 as set in the original paper. Full details about the
dataset creation, task losses, main model and classifier architecture are in the supplement. Table 4
lists the results. We see that GREAT performs better or on par with GradNorm, despite having
no tunable hyperparameters. This indicates that the extra parameters in the GALs are sufficient
to absorb dataset-specific information without requiring hand-tuning. On CIFAR-10, we see that
GREAT performs best on edge detection and denoised auto-encoding, and is close to the best value
for colorization. The high classification error for the uncertainty-based method and high RMSE
values of the baseline on the other three tasks indicates that classification is antagonistic to the other
three tasks. However, both GradNorm and GREAT are able to correctly balance the gradient flowing
from classification with the other tasks. On the NYUv2 dataset we see that GREAT performs best on
depth and normal estimation, and is within ≈ 0.005 RSME on keypoint detection. Overall, we see
that GREAT performs better than all other methods on four of the seven tasks, and is close to the best
values in all cases.
Method
CIFAR-10 NYUv2
Class Color Edge Auto Depth Normal Keypoint
% Error RMSE RMSE RMSE RMSE 1-|cos| RMSE
Equal 24.0 0.131 0.349 0.113 0.861 0.207 0.407
Uncertainty 26.6 0.111 0.270 0.090 0.796 0.192 0.389
GradNorm 23.5 0.116 0.270 0.091 0.810 0.169 0.377
GREAT 24.2 0.114 0.252 0.087 0.779 0.167 0.382
Table 4: Test errors of multi-task learning on the CIFAR-10 and NYUv2 datasets. GREAT performs
best on 2 tasks each for CIFAR and NYUv2, and has comparable performance on the other tasks.
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4 Conclusion and future work
We have introduced gradient adversarial training and demonstrated its applicability in diverse sce-
narios: from defense against adversarial examples to knowledge distillation to multi-task learning.
We show that adaptations of GREAT offer (a) strong defense to both targeted and non-targeted
adversarial examples, (b) can easily distill knowledge from different teacher networks without heavy
parameter tuning, and (c) aid multi-task learning by tuning a gradient alignment layer. There are
several directions of future work in the proposed domains. We wish to investigate others forms of
loss functions beyond GREACE that are symbiotic with GREAT, explore progressive training of
student networks using ideas from Progressive-GAN [15] to better learn from the teacher, and absorb
the explicit parameters in the GALs directly into the optimizer as done with the mean and variance
estimates for each weight parameter in ADAM [17]. The general approach underlying GREAT of
passing an adversarial gradient signal to a network is broadly applicable to domains beyond the ones
discussed here such as to the discriminator in domain adversarial training [6] and GANs [7]. We
can also replace direct gradient tensor evaluation with synthetic gradients [14] for efficiency. In the
future we will explore these exciting avenues. Holistically, we believe that understanding gradient
distributions will help uncover the underlying mechanisms that govern the successful training of deep
architectures using backpropagation, and gradient adversarial training is a step towards this direction.
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Supplementary Material
GREAT for adversarial defense
We use the publicly available CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets for our experiments. Both datasets have
color images of size 32x32x3 and 10 classes. CIFAR-10 has 50000 training examples and 10000
test examples. SVHN has 73257 digits for training and 26032 digits for testing. We perform data
augmentation by 4-padding the image during training and randomly cropping a 32x32 image. As
mentioned in the main manuscript we use a ResNet-18 architecture for the main network on both
datasets. We use a ResNet-18 for the auxiliary classifier as well, with the ReLU activations replaced
with leaky-ReLU. The α parameter in leaky-ReLU is set to 0.2. We use ADAM with initial learning
rate of 0.001 to train both the main and auxiliary network, and lr, the learning rate multiplier is
calculated as (1− e/emax)0.9 where e, emax are the current epoch and total epochs, respectively. α
and β follow the rate policy of αmax(1− lr) and βmax(1− lr), i.e., increase gradually with epochs.
The adversarially trained network is fed clean samples and adversarial samples with equal probability.
The total loss used for training the network is 0.5 ∗ (Lclean + Ladv), where Lclean and Ladv is the
cross-entropy loss on the true labels. Adversarial examples are generated using a single-step FGSM
and  = 0.2 for both datasets. We train all networks for 100 epochs on both datasets.
GREAT for knowledge distillation
As described in the main manuscript, we evaluate knowledge distillation for four scenarios. We
describe the architecture for student, teacher and auxiliary network for each scenario along with other
hyper-parameters used during training.
• CNN-5+ResNet-18: We use a 5-layer CNN model with 3 convolution layers of kernel size
3x3 and padding 1. The second and third convolution layers are of stride 2. The final two
layers are linear layers. The number of channels in the first layer are 32 and it increases by a
factor of 2 in every succeeding convolutional layer. The penultimate layer has 128 channels.
All layers are succeeded by batch-normalization and ReLU activation, except the last linear
layer. The teacher is a pre-trained ResNet-18 architecture on CIFAR-10 obtained from 3.
The binary classifier is of the same architecture as the student network, except the ReLU
activations are replaced with leaky-ReLU with α = 0.2. We perform data augmentation
during training in the form of random horizontal flips and random crops from a 4-padded
image. We use ADAM optimizer with initial learning rate of 0.001 decreased using the
multiplier (1− e/emax)0.9 as described for adversarial defense. We train the network for
50 epochs on both the dense as well as sparse sample regime.
• ResNet-18+ResNext-29-8: We use a a standard ResNet-18 as the student model and a
pre-trained ResNext-29-8 architecture on CIFAR-10 obtained from the same link as above.
The binary classifier is a ResNet-11 architecture comprised of 8 ResNet module layers, 1
convolutional layer, 1 average pooling layer and final linear layer for classification. The
ReLU activations in the ResNet blocks are replaced with leaky-ReLU (α = 0.2 ). We
perform data augmentation during training in the form of random horizontal flips and
random crops from a 4-padded image. We use ADAM optimizer with initial learning rate of
0.001 decreased using the multiplier (1− e/emax)0.9 as described for adversarial defense.
We train the network for 100 epochs on both the dense as well as sparse sample regime.
• ResNet-18+ResNet-50 : We use a a ResNet-18 and ResNet-152 suitable for CIFAR-10
dataset as the student-teacher combination. The first convolutional layer is of stride 2 to
compensate for 64x64 input size. The binary classifier is a ResNet-18 like ResNet-11
architecture comprised of 4 ResNet module layers each with 2 convolutional layers, 1 simple
convolutional layer, 1 average pooling layer and final linear layer for classification. The
first layer in the ResNet-11 architecture is of stride 2 to compensate for 64x64 input size.
The ReLU activations in the ResNet blocks are replaced with leaky-ReLU(α = 0.2 ). The
images are randomly scaled and resized to have minimum dimension of 70. Then a random
crop of size 64x64 is performed on the augmented images. We use SGD optimizer with
momentum 0.9, weight decay 5e-4, and initial learning rate of 0.01 decreased using the
multiplier (1− e/emax)0.9. We train the teacher network for 100 epochs. We then train the
student model for 50 epochs on both the dense as well as sparse sample regime.
3https://stanford.app.box.com/s/5lwrieh9g1upju0iz9ru93m9d7uo3sox
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• ResNet-18+ResNet-152 : We use a a ResNet-18 and ResNet-152 suitable for ImageNet
as the student-teacher combination. The binary classifier is a ResNet-18 like ResNet-11
architecture comprised of 4 ResNet module layers each with 2 convolutional layers, 1 simple
convolutional layer, 1 average pooling layer and final linear layer for classification. The
ReLU activations in the ResNet blocks are replaced with leaky-ReLU (α = 0.2 ). The
images are randomly scaled and resized to have minimum dimension of 256. Then a random
crop of size 224x224 is performed on the augmented images. We use SGD optimizer with
momentum 0.9, weight decay 5e-4, and initial learning rate of 0.01 decreased it using the
multiplier (1− e/emax)0.9. We train the teacher network for 50 epochs. We then train the
student model for 30 epochs on both the dense as well as sparse sample regime.
We set α = 0.1 and temperature value equal to 20 for distillation in the dense regime. We set
α = 0.99 and temperature value equal to 20 for distillation in the sparse regime. These values are
optimal for CNN-5+ResNet-18 combination as determined via grid search. The same values were
used for experiments on mini-ImageNet. The optimal values for the sparse and dense regime for
the ResNet-18+ResNext-29-8 combination were determined to be α = 0.95 and temperature equal
to 6. We also investigated Sobolev training of neural networks which directly matches the gradient
distribution on the CNN-5+ResNet-18 combination. We determined optimal alpha parameters, and
evaluated the dense and sparse regime accuracy to be 84.98 and 66.50% percent respectively, as
opposed to GREAT with 85.72% and 66.55% respectively.
GREAT for multitask learning
We perform multi-task learning on two datasets: (a) CIFAR-10 and (b) NYUv2. For CIFAR-10 we
convert the color images into grayscale. We then add salt and pepper noise with equal probability
to 4% of the pixels. We further add speckle noise with gaussian probability of 0.1. We use a Canny
edge detector with σ = 1 on the colored images and set it to be the ground truth edges. The shared
encoder in the CIFAR-10 multi-task learning architecture is a standard ResNet-18 minus the pooling
and linear layers. These layers are instead used in the classification decoder. The decoder for edge
detection, colorization and denoising consist of 3 upsampling layers of scale 2 and 3 ResNet blocks.
Classification task was trained with cross-entropy loss and the other three were trained using MSE
loss. We use ADAM optimizer with initial learning rate of 0.001 and decreased it using the multiplier
(1− e/emax)0.9. The classifier is a ResNet-11 with 256 input channels, decreased by a factor of 2
over 4 ResNet modules, followed by a pooling and a linear layer for 4-way classification. The ReLU
activations in the ResNet blocks are replaced with leaky-ReLU with α = 0.2. The weight tensors
(GradNorm, Uncertainty), task classifier and GALs were trained with ADAM and the same learning
rate policy as the main network. Note we normalize the weights in the uncertainty based method to
sum to 1 for a fair comparison to GradNorm. We train the networks for 50 epochs.
The multitask dataset for NYUv2 is created from the NYUv2 depth images. We augment the standard
NYUv2 depth dataset with additional frames from each video, resulting in ≈45,000 images complete
with pixel-wise depth, surface normals, and room keypoint labels. Keypoint labels are obtained
through professional human labeling services, while surface normals are generated algorithmically.
The full dataset is then split by scene and we get 26328 training images and 18582 test images. All
inputs are downsampled to 320 x 320 pixels and outputs to 80 x 80 pixels. We use these resolutions
following GradNorm. The shared encoder is a dilated residual network with 43 layers, of which 2
intermediate layers have a dilation rate of 2 and 1 has a dilation rate of 4. The input is downsampled
8 times over the layers. The number of output channels after the encoder is 512. The decoder for
the 3 tasks comprises of a single upsampling of stride 2 and 3 convolution layers. Depth estimate
has a single channel, normal estimation has 3 channel, while keypoint estimation has 48 channels.
As in GradNorm, we generate Gaussian heatmaps for each of 48 room keypoint types and predict
these heatmaps with a pixel-wise squared loss. We use one minus the absolute cosine similarity as
the normal estimation loss and MSE as the depth estimation loss. The classifier is a ResNet-11 with
512 input channels, decreased by a factor of 2 over 4 ResNet modules, followed by a pooling and a
linear layer for 3-way classification. The ReLU activations in the ResNet blocks are replaced with
leaky-ReLU with α = 0.2. We use ADAM optimizer with initial learning rate of 0.001 and decreased
it using the multiplier (1− e/emax)0.9 for training all modules and networks. We train the network
for 30 epochs.
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